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DORMANCY VERSUS INNOVATION: A NEXT 
GENERATION DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
SAM KALEN* 
Over the last half century, countries have clung tenaciously to the 
concept of nation-states while economies around the globe became 
inextricably linked. National markets morphed into international markets 
with consumers, not just industries, unfettered by political boundaries. The 
nature of environmental threats changed as well: from easily perceived and 
immediate harms to subtle and yet insidious harms with manifestations not 
readily perceptible to the average person. Instead of the infamous Cuyahoga 
River fire, mercury-infected fish floating in the Great Lakes, or 
smokestacks emitting enough particulate matter to envelop a city, we now 
have multifaceted, multilayered international problems, ranging from 
increased ozone depleting substances and diminishing ocean resources to 
rising populations with changing eating habits and land use patterns and, of 
course, rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the resulting global 
consequences. That we now live in Thomas L. Friedman’s Hot, Flat, and 
Crowded1 world is uncontestable; yet constitutional dogma still dictates that 
we have a national market protected from some parochial state and local 
regulation. The negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause (DCC) 
presumes that certain national issues are reserved exclusively to Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. I am grateful to 
Stephen M. Feldman for his helpful comments and insights. I also would like to thank the 
editors of the Oklahoma Law Review for their considerable assistance and editorial support. 
 1. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN 
REVOLUTION–AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA (2008). 
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and state and local governments are prohibited from intruding into those 
areas absent congressional assent.2 
This reservation of regulatory authority is increasingly problematic, as 
consequences of globalization are as much local as national. The polar local 
and international stages have eclipsed the national arena. The present 
political paradigm only exacerbates this duality. Today’s Congress lacks the 
congeniality that existed fifty years ago, and any suggestion that its 
members can achieve consensus through rational, interest group pluralism 
appears dominated instead by public choice theory.3 In lieu of 
gamesmanship, we now have partisan gridlock.4 And it seems unlikely to 
change anytime soon. But people continue to live, eat, shop, and recreate at 
a local level—indeed, one that is now primarily urban. Expectedly, 
therefore, we are witnessing an escalating emphasis on place and the rise of 
localism, prompting local communities to assert control over their own 
economic and environmental destiny.5 This, of course, parallels the 
emergence of the urban center, which has become the economic engine for 
states and, indirectly, the nation. Today, as Professor Richard Schragger 
explains, “[W]hen one speaks about the free trade constitution, one is 
mostly speaking about inter- and intra-metropolitan trade; to talk about the 
national economy is to talk mostly about urban-based development and 
urban-based trade flows.”6 And urban centers will continue to explore 
opportunities for asserting greater influence over their surroundings, 
affecting the flow of capital, permitting different types of industries, and 
specifying the conditions in which those industries will be allowed to 
operate.7 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Professor Pursley suggests that we should view the DCC as a conceptual element in 
what he labels a “State Preclusion Thesis.” Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 
497, 529 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING & PUBLIC LAW 61-67 (2005) 
(exploring public choice theory in deregulated markets). 
 4. Jonathan Weisman, Senate’s Long Slide to Gridlock, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, at 
A1. 
 5. See DAVID J. HESS, LOCALIST MOVEMENTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: SUSTAINABILITY, 
JUSTICE, AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 5-8 (2009). 
 6. Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade 
Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 7. Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 484, 539 (2009). See generally JEB BRUGMANN, 
WELCOME TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 27-32 
(2009); MATTHEW E. KAHN, GREEN CITIES: URBAN GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50-66 
(2006). 
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Yet, creative state and local solutions for addressing modern challenges 
are becoming increasingly suspect under the DCC. And as state and local 
programs outpace federal efforts to respond to such wide-ranging 
challenges as climate change and reduced fossil fuel consumption, the DCC 
operates as the proverbial sword of Damocles hanging over these 
programs.8 The DCC surfaces, for instance, when states restrict the import 
of carbon-intensive energy9 or when they require the purchase of local 
renewable resources.10 Also, states’ regional efforts to address climate 
change may implicate the DCC, to the extent that such programs address 
the problem of leakage of GHG emissions to areas outside of the regional 
effort.11 In particular, California’s progressive approach for addressing 
                                                                                                                 
 8. With the emphasis on reduced fossil fuel dependence and the need for local 
communities to secure new energy resources, the likelihood of an ever-growing movement 
toward distributed energy is poised to have local communities become energy islands, 
marginally tied to an interstate grid. See JEFFREY RUSSELL & STEVEN WEISSMAN, BERKELEY 
LAW, CTR. FOR LAW, ENERGY & THE ENV’T, CALIFORNIA’S TRANSITION TO LOCAL 
RENEWABLE ENERGY: 12,000 MEGAWATTS BY 2020, at 2-4 (Public Draft Feb. 27, 2012) 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Transition_to_Local_Renewable_Energy_ 
February_2012_DRAFT(1).pdf. But with such a future, subnational level communities are 
likely to protect themselves through some trade barrier restrictions, only to implicate DCC 
concerns. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 
250 (1999). 
 9. See Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can 
California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants 
Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 204-05 (2007). 
 10. See Stephen C. Braverman, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the Commerce 
Clause, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 16-17 (2011); Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: 
World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional 
Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 158, 178 (2010); see also Joel H. Mack et al., 
All RECs Are Local: How In-State Generation Requirements Adversely Affect Development 
of a Robust REC Market, ELECTRICITY J., May 2011, at 8. 
 11. See William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade 
Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 363-69 (2009); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law 
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State 
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1444-46 (2008); Juliet Howland, 
Comment, Not All Carbon Credits Are Created Equal: The Constitution and the Cost of 
Regional Cap-and-Trade Market Linkage, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 413, 446-55 
(2009); Margaret C. Hupp, Comment, Congressional Consent Under the Compact Clause: 
Plugging the Leaks in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 84 TUL. L. REV. 469, 480 
(2009); Mary Bede Russell, Note, What’s It to You?: The Difficulty of Valuing the Benefits 
of Climate-Change Mitigation and the Need for a Public-Goods Test Under Dormant 
Commerce Clause Analysis, 94 IOWA L. REV. 727, 743-44 (2009). 
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climate change has raised DCC concerns,12 and recently prompted a district 
court to invalidate the state’s low carbon fuel standard.13 Stifling these and 
similarly laudable local efforts is problematic and, more importantly, 
unnecessary. 
Nothing about the DCC necessitates deploying the judicially constructed 
doctrine in the same manner that it exists today. As our society and 
constitutional doctrines have changed since the early republic, so too has 
the approach to the DCC. It has witnessed four different generations of 
analysis, with each new generation struggling to match the needs of society 
at the time with the policy animating the DCC. And nothing about the latest 
generation of tests under the DCC warrants strict adherence to stare decisis. 
After all, different generations have produced different tests for measuring 
the constitutionality of state and local programs allegedly violating the 
negative prohibition. 
Part I, therefore, reviews the first three generations of DCC analysis, 
illustrating how the emerging dual federalism paradigm influenced the 
Court’s DCC cases prior to the New Deal. Part II then examines the 
changing and now modern DCC, demonstrating that the Court intended to 
narrow the scope of the Clause. It was during this period that the Court 
crafted tests, particularly a balancing test, with minimal analysis or thought. 
But the modern DCC tests have not necessarily reduced the Clause’s 
impact, as expected by the New Deal Court, so Part III examines how the 
DCC has cabined state and local programs. Part IV unmasks the inherent 
problem with the tests now being deployed and offers an alternative 
approach to the DCC. 
I. Growth of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The development of the DCC reflects a fluid process for distinguishing: 
(1) those instances when states may exercise exclusive jurisdiction, (2) 
those circumstances where states and Congress may exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction, and (3) those subjects reserved exclusively to Congress except 
when Congress affirmatively chooses to permit state regulation.14 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10654 (2007). 
 13. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, Nos. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, CV-
F-10-163 LJO DLB, 2012 WL 217653, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012); see infra notes 175-
79 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209-13 (1894). 
The Court’s application of other clauses indicated that the presence of concurrent 
jurisdiction only lasts until Congress expresses its will and supersedes any inconsistent state 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/2
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Undoubtedly, the framers of the Constitution feared state regulation of 
foreign commerce, and, to some degree, further internecine trade wars 
among the former colonies.15 But little in that history suggests anything 
more than that the framers recognized the need to vest Congress with the 
power to regulate trade both locally and internationally. It does not, for 
instance, begin to illuminate what subjects might fall into which of the three 
identified categories. 
In Federalist No. 32, Alexander Hamilton presaged the third 
circumstance, describing three instances when the United States would need 
to exercise exclusive authority: 
                                                                                                                 
efforts. See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 75-76 (1820) (finding a federal 
exercise of authority precluded state prosecution under state militia act). Congress’s 
authority over naturalization generated a similar inquiry. See Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 
U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269-70 (1817); United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377, 377-78 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1797) (No. 16,622); Collet v. Collet, 6 F. Cas. 105, 107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (No. 3001). 
 15. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2004) (“All of the 
concrete programs intended to be forwarded by giving Congress the power to regulate 
commerce were restrictions on international trade . . . .”). For an excellent account of the 
practices prior to the Constitution, see Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era 
Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 59-66 (2005-2006). See also Barry Friedman & Daniel T. 
Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1884-96 (2011). That the framers recognized the possible need 
for uniform commercial intercourse seems apparent. See 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 115 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES] (“[C]onsider how far a uniform system in their commercial intercourse and 
regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony . . . .”). “It 
is impossible to read the correspondence of Madison, Hamilton, Mason, and others without 
perceiving the imperative necessity that they felt of committing the regulation of trade and 
commerce to a single national authority.” George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 26 (1955). But such sentiments 
obscure whether the power is exclusive or concurrent. Often, the sentiments were linked to 
foreign commerce. James Madison explained: 
The want of authority in Congress to regulate commerce had produced in 
foreign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopolizing policy, injurious to 
the trade of the United States, and destructive to their navigation . . . . The same 
want of a general power over commerce led to an exercise of the power, 
separately, by the states, which not only proved abortive, but engendered rival, 
conflicting, and angry regulations. 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 119. Friedman and Deacon attempt to illustrate why the 
framers intended exclusivity, and while I find their account a bit too cursory, it is not the 
purpose of this article to engage in that debate. See Friedman & Deacon, supra, at 1905. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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[W]here the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive 
authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an 
authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from 
exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to 
the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be 
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.16 
Hamilton’s example suggests that he omitted the regulation of commerce as 
one reserved exclusively to Congress.17 Invoking the power to tax in Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 1, Hamilton suggested that Congress’s power to levy 
and collect taxes and duties on imports and exports precluded similar state 
regulation, reasoning that state regulation was barred because of the 
corollary clause in Article I, Section 10, which restricted the states’ ability 
to impose any imposts or duties on imports or exports.18 He explained that 
“[t]his restriction implies an admission that if it were not inserted the States 
would possess the power it excludes; [and that in all other respects the 
States’ power is] undiminished.”19 When responding to the concern that 
states might need to defray the costs of inspection before exporting 
products, James Madison suggested that states could explore ways of doing 
so and the check against any abuse “was the right in the general 
government to regulate trade between state and state.”20 When a measure 
for state duties on tonnage was presented by Mr. M’Henry and Mr. Carroll, 
Madison apparently “was more and more convinced that the regulation of 
commerce was in its nature indivisible, and ought to be wholly under one 
authority.”21 Apparently responding to the suggestion that Congress would 
need exclusive jurisdiction over commerce, Mr. Sherman replied: “The 
                                                                                                                 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 17. It is not necessarily clear whether the word “commerce” itself includes simply 
mercantile trade or something else. Others note this issue too, further underscoring the 
limited utility in resorting to the framers’ “actual” intent. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 2-3; 
Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to 
Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 56-59 (2010). Occasionally, at least, 
the colonists used “commerce” in lieu of the word “trade,” such as when referring to treaties 
of commerce. See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 88. 
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 16, at 198-99 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 19. Id. at 199. 
 20. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 539. 
 21. Id. at 548. James Madison later suggested that regulating “commerce” was entrusted 
exclusively to the federal domain; it was Madison’s subsequent letters that led Albert Abel 
to infer that view on the delegates during the convention. Albert S. Abel, The Commerce 
Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 
432, 469, 492 (1941). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/2
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power of the United States to regulate trade, being supreme, can control 
interferences of the state regulations, when such interferences happen; so 
that there is no danger to be apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction.”22 
Early nineteenth-century decisions often focused on whether a particular 
activity was entrusted to the states’ police power, assigned to Congress, or, 
quite possibly, subject to concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.23 The same 
year that Congress passed the 1824 General Survey Bill expected to 
facilitate the development of roads and canals, the Supreme Court issued 
Gibbons v. Ogden.24 This seminal case involved New York’s legislative 
grant of an exclusive right to operate steamboats over the state’s navigable 
waters to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton.25 Following New York’s 
lead, other states began granting similar exclusive rights or passing 
retaliatory measures.26 The case arose after an initial round of litigation, 
with Aaron Ogden eventually obtaining the rights previously held by 
Livingston and Fulton, and Ogden suing his former partner, Thomas 
Gibbons, who sought to operate boats in New York waters.27 Gibbons 
defended by arguing that his boats were licensed under the laws of the 
United States and duly enrolled at Perth Amboy, New Jersey.28 
The Court held that the state monopoly conflicted with the federal 
Coasting License Act of 1793,29 putting an end to a generally regarded 
                                                                                                                 
 22. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 548. Barry Friedman and Daniel Deacon, in 
attempting to buttress their argument that the framers expected that the Commerce Clause 
vested exclusive jurisdiction in Congress and that the courts would supervise and review 
intruding state legislation, suggest that Sherman too supported exclusive jurisdiction. 
Friedman & Deacon, supra note 15, at 1900. Yet their argument arguably relies too heavily 
on broad statements by the framers about judicial review. See id. at 1896-1903. 
 23. See Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First Century, 
13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 417, 424-50 (1988). 
 24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 25. Id. at 1. In 1812, the New York judiciary upheld several of these statutes. Livingston 
v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 590 (N.Y. 1812), overruled by N. River Steam Boat Co. v. 
Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825). 
 26. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 598 
(1947). Professor Kent Newmyer notes that “[s]uch practices threatened to fractionalize 
national commerce and retard the use of new transportation—the steamboat in 1824, perhaps 
the railroad six years later.” R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL 
AND TANEY 50 (1968). The Court was well aware of the potential impact of these retaliatory 
statutes on commerce. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (2 Pet.) 102, 159-60 (1837) 
(Story, J., dissenting). 
 27. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 2. 
 28. Id. at 27. 
 29. Id. at 239 (Johnson, J., concurring). New York Chancellor James Kent, from whose 
state the case arose, was quite dismayed at this use of the Coasting License Act. He observed 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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onerous monopoly.30 But Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion for the 
Court suggested that Congress exercised an expansive power under the 
Commerce Clause that reached “every species of commercial intercourse,” 
including navigation.31 This power, quite naturally, did not end at 
jurisdictional lines, but rather operated “within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the several States.”32 
Chief Justice Marshall further distinguished between two spheres of 
jurisdiction: the commercial power delegated to the federal government and 
that power reserved to the states under the Constitution.33 States retained 
their power to regulate or police trade “which does not extend to or affect 
other States,” and which is completely within a state.34 The power of 
taxation is one example.35 Responding to the specter of state quarantine and 
inspection laws thereby becoming unconstitutional, Chief Justice Marshall 
admitted that, while such laws affected interstate commerce, states could 
exercise “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing 
within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government.”36 
If, according to Chief Justice Marshall, the state law’s object was 
permissible, then the means chosen would be acceptable, even if those 
                                                                                                                 
that when Congress passed the Act, “it never occurred to any one” that the Act was a 
regulation of commerce and prohibitory of any such state grants; instead, Kent indicated that 
the Act was designed “to exclude foreign vessels from commerce between the states, in 
order to cherish the growth of our own marine, and to provide that the coasting trade should 
be conducted with security to the revenue.” 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 435 (Lacy ed. 1889). For a convincing argument that Chief Justice Marshall deftly 
navigated between the need to articulate a theory of the Commerce Clause and a desire to 
avoid having the Court be seen as an opponent of state legislation, see Norman R. Williams, 
Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1401-02 (2004). Historian Charles McCurdy makes this 
point as well. See Charles McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the 
Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 635 (1978). 
 30. See generally 1 WARREN, supra note 26, at 612-28. Warren speculated that Justice 
Story might have written the opinion because Chief Justice Marshall at that time had an 
injured shoulder and the Justices occasionally wrote opinions for their colleagues. See id. at 
608; G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 
1, 14-15, 19-20, 20 n.72 (1984) (noting the speculation that Chief Justice Marshall may have 
dictated the opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)). 
 31. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193. 
 32. Id. at 196. 
 33. Id. at 194-96. 
 34. Id. at 194. 
 35. Id. at 198-200. 
 36. Id. at 203. 
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means mirrored what might be employed by the federal government under 
the commercial power.37 
Until midcentury, the Court’s either willingness or ability to outline the 
boundaries of exclusive federal versus concurrent state power became 
impeded by a changing Court, slavery, temperance, and deciding whether 
internal improvements were federal or state concerns.38 No clear consensus 
emerged for resolving whether a regulatory object was one reserved 
exclusively to Congress, one subject to exclusive state jurisdiction, or one 
subject to concurrent state jurisdiction.39 Then, in Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens, the Court employed a somewhat talismanic test: whether the 
particular subject matter was national or local in scope, with the former 
reserved exclusively to Congress.40 This belief, that issues could be 
categorized as either national or local, permeated much of the Court’s 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence.41 It served as the basis for Justice Story’s 
opinion in Swift v. Tyson, where he distinguished between “local” law and 
the general commercial law which required uniformity and was governed 
by the law of nations.42 If the object of the regulation required uniform, 
national legislation, then the subject would be reserved exclusively to 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Justice William Johnson concurred, emphasizing that the state law conflicted with 
Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce. Id. at 236 (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
 38. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 429. 
 39. See generally id. at 429-38. 
 40. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
 41. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 438-43; see also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: 
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 80 (1904) (“A further distinction is based 
upon a difference between the local and the national aspect of commerce . . . .”). See 
generally Charles A. Heckman, The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of 
Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century and the Federal System, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
246 (1973). Justice Story’s principal biographer notes that Justice Story’s opinion in Swift v. 
Tyson apparently reflected a general consensus at the time. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 336 (1985). And one 
commentator later lamented that “[c]ommerce blended into contract: contract merged with 
the whole body of general law; and when this point had been reached, torts and even real 
property fought an unequal battle against the desire of the national judiciary to free itself 
from unquestioning obedience to local law.” MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 136 (1949). 
 42. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938). See generally TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES 
IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 37-43 (1981). 
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Congress.43 In County of Mobile v. Kimball, for instance, Alabama’s 
program for dredging a channel and constructing an artificial harbor 
survived a constitutional challenge, with the Court concluding that the 
program merely “aided” commerce and admitted of local, rather than 
uniform, regulation: 
The subjects . . . upon which Congress can act under this power 
are of infinite variety . . . . Some of them are national in their 
character, and admit and require uniformity of regulation, 
affecting alike all the States; others are local, or are mere aids to 
commerce, and can only be properly regulated by provisions 
adapted to their special circumstances and localities.44 
This fits comfortably into the prevailing dual federalism framework for 
allocating power between spheres of jurisdiction.45 And it further suggested 
another talismanic test: any direct regulation of interstate commerce 
necessarily intruded into the sphere reserved to Congress in the first 
instance.46 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318. Yet, “[i]t was not until after the Civil War,” Professor David 
Currie explains, “that the commerce clause had been unambiguously employed to strike 
down state legislation, but in the remaining years of the Court’s first century it had been 
wielded with increasing frequency to protect commerce against state interference.” DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–1986, at 
31 (1990). 
 44. 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880). 
 45. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text; infra notes 51-52. 
 46. See, e.g., Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1893) (holding that a local 
license fee directly burdened interstate commerce); McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104, 114 
(1890). In Hall v. DeCuir, the Court invalidated Louisiana’s Equal Accommodation Act, 
which prohibited racial discrimination against passengers on interstate carriers. 95 U.S. 485, 
491 (1877). The statute, according to the Court, operated directly upon interstate commerce. 
Id. at 488. Similarly, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, the Court held that 
Illinois’s regulation of rates for carriers engaged in interstate traffic constituted an 
impermissible direct burden on commerce. 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886); see also Seaboard Air 
Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 316 (1917) (holding a railroad speed check 
unconstitutional); Hous. & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321, 331 (1906) (holding a 
railroad requirement for furnishing cars unconstitutional); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. 
Louis Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514, 523 (1900) (invalidating railroad stop statute); Ill. Cent. 
R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 154 (1896) (holding that a requirement of interstate traffic to 
make certain stops was an impermissible direct burden on commerce). To the extent the 
Court concluded that a statute only indirectly burdened interstate commerce, it survived. 
“The interference with the commercial power must be direct, and not the mere incidental 
effect of the requirement of the usual proportional contribution to public maintenance.” 
N.Y., Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431, 439 (1895); see also Mo., Kan. & 
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II. Fourth Generation DCC 
The nineteenth century talismanic tests soon succumbed to the evolving 
constitutional paradigm of the New Deal era. The Court no longer appeared 
comfortable with the existing three broad generations of tests which 
focused on spheres of jurisdiction, including, first, whether the DCC 
operated as an exclusive or concurrent grant of power and whether a 
particular area commanded a national or local focus; or next whether an 
issue could be categorized as part of the states’ police powers or part of the 
federal commercial power; or later whether the statute operated directly 
upon interstate commerce or only indirectly burdened interstate commerce. 
Justice Holmes foreshadowed the Court’s ultimate rejection of the 
nineteenth-century tests when he introduced the “current of commerce” 
theory expanding the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.47 
Justice Holmes’s opinion mirrored the emerging scholarly criticism of both 
the affirmative and the negative aspects of the Commerce Clause, the latter 
stymieing modern state regulation.48 Progressives favoring state or national 
regulation attacked the Court’s prior tests as too restrictive.49 After all, 
                                                                                                                 
Tex. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 627-28 (1898); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 318 
(1896); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 700 (1895); Budd v. New York, 143 
U.S. 517, 545 (1892); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 104 (1876). 
 47. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905). The growth of the 
vertically integrated national market and the ability of states to levy gross receipt taxes on 
businesses likely shaped the Court’s evolving skepticism about prior DCC tests. See Gwin, 
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438-41 (1939) (examining the DCC and 
imposition of gross receipt taxes); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 324-33 
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (reviewing the DCC and gross receipt taxes and suggesting 
laws should be measured against an unfair and unjust standard). In a license tax case 
involving insurance, Chief Justice Rutledge reviewed the DCC generally and observed that 
“its implied negative operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable” 
and “slippery.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418 (1946). See generally 
Allison Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions (Ain’t God Tough on 
Indiana), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 214-16 (1947). 
 48. See, e.g., James M. Beck, Nullification by Indirection, 23 HARV. L. REV. 441, 454-
55 (1910); Henry Wolf Biklë, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200, 220-24 
(1927); Robert Eugene Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 381, 452, 482-83 (1919); Thurlow M. Gordon, The 
Child Labor Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45, 51-52 (1918); Charles W. Needham, The 
Exclusive Power of Congress over Interstate Commerce, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 260 
(1911); Clarence G. Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, 23 DICK. 
L. REV. 78, 139, 160-64 (1918). 
 49. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000). 
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during the Court’s first century, opponents of state regulation marshaled the 
clause with increasing frequency to shield economic activity from state 
interference.50 And it equally limited the reach of progressive federal 
legislation that intruded into the states’ domain.51 Scholars such as 
Professor Noel T. Dowling therefore detailed the bankruptcy of these 
formalistic tests and encouraged charting of a new direction.52 Echoing his 
dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,53 Chief Justice Stone, first in South 
Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers54 and later in 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,55 implicitly offered another 
approach for resolving DCC issues. Chief Justice Stone, favoring 
legislature policy judgments,56 noted that Congress “may determine 
                                                                                                                 
 50. CURRIE, supra note 43, at 31. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 7-8 (1937). 
 51. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 
251, 276-77 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). Chief Justice 
Rutledge later lamented: 
[T]he arc traveled by the negative pendulum has turned out not to be 
coextensive with that in which the affirmative one oscillates. The scope of the 
prohibition against state action is not correlative, in any of the basic 
implications, with the full reach of the positive power given to Congress. But 
this was not always realized . . . . 
WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 47 (1947). 
 52. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 19-28 
(1940); Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 558-60 (1947) [hereinafter Dowling, Revised Version]. The dramatic 
change in society by the early twentieth century had rendered the local/national distinction 
untenable, along with the formalistic dual federalism paradigm. And “[a]round the time of 
the New Deal, policy makers and courts began to surrender the idea of separate spheres and 
acknowledge overlapping authority, interaction, and cooperation.” Garrick B. Pursley, 
Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2011) (reviewing ROBERT A. 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009)). Chief Justice Rutledge’s 1946 majority 
opinion in Benjamin, for instance, reviewed the “judicial oscillation” surrounding the clause 
and suggested how coordinated federal-state action ought to replace an analysis focused on 
overlapping spheres. 328 U.S. at 408, 412-14, 418-24, 433-36. 
 53. 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 54. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
 55. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 56. SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT 63-64, 92-93 
(1946). Konefsky observes that: 
Stone would want the Court to be guided in its interpretation of that clause by 
an awareness of the problems of our society. Its responsibility is to “maintain 
the national interest and at the same time bring it into an effective harmony 
with local interests and the principles of local government.” 
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whether the burdens imposed [by state programs] are too great, and may, by 
legislation designed to secure uniformity,” pass laws “to protect the 
national interest in the commerce, [and] curtail to some extent the state’s 
regulatory power.”57 For Chief Justice Stone, the critical inquiry involved 
determining whether the law discriminated between in-state and out-of-state 
interests.58 The inquiry also still required ensuring that the subject of the 
regulation was not one demanding national uniformity.59 When defending 
the Court’s shift in DCC analysis, Chief Justice Rutledge observed that the 
narrowing of the Clause “has come on the whole to require substantial 
danger, real or actually threatening, of creating” a “balkanized America.”60 
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, for example, Madison, Wisconsin, 
required that all pasteurized milk available for sale in the city be processed 
and bottled in a facility within five miles of the city.61 The law undoubtedly 
discriminated against both interstate and other in-state sellers of pasteurized 
milk, with the city purportedly claiming that it needed to be able to inspect 
the processing and bottling facilities for health and safety reasons—
ostensibly not being able to do so if those facilities were located beyond the 
five-mile radius.62 Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court invalidated 
the ordinance, reasoning that other less discriminatory means were 
available to achieve the health and safety objective: either relying on other 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 97 (quoting Harlan F. Stone, Fifty Years Work of the United States Supreme Court, 53 
A.B.A. REP. 259, 264 (1928)); see also HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 114-21 (1961) (describing Chief Justice Stone’s 
approach to the Commerce Clause). 
 57. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 189-90; see also id. at 190-91 (“When the action of a 
legislature is within the scope of its power, fairly debatable questions as to its 
reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the 
legislative body, on which rests the duty and responsibility of decision.”). 
 58. Id. at 185-86, 189-90. 
 59. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 n.1 (1939) (“The failure of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce has generally been taken to signify a 
Congressional purpose to leave undisturbed the authority of the states to make regulations 
affecting the commerce in matters of peculiarly local concern, but to withhold from them 
authority to make regulations affecting those phases of it which, because of the need of a 
national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single 
authority.”). Professor Dowling notes that Chief Justice Stone’s analysis echoed aspects of 
Cooley. Dowling, Revised Version, supra note 52, at 551. 
 60. RUTLEDGE, supra note 51, at 72-73. 
 61. 340 U.S. 349, 350 (1951).  
 62. Id. 
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community inspection programs or sending inspectors to other areas and 
charging those facilities for the increased cost of the travel.63 
By 1970, Chief Justice Stone’s caveat that even those nondiscriminatory 
measures that involved subjects demanding national uniformity might 
violate the DCC surfaced in Arizona’s prohibition against the out-of-state 
shipment of cantaloupes unless packaged in state approved containers.64 In 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court issued only a sparse opinion and 
invalidated Arizona’s program.65 The Court recognized that the law served 
a legitimate interest, albeit twice referring to that interest as “tenuous” and 
“minimal.”66 The Court next acknowledged that it apparently had 
previously used a balancing test (referring to Chief Justice Stone’s opinion 
in Southern Pacific Co.),67 though “more frequently it has spoken in terms 
of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and burdens.”68 The placement in the 
opinion of this acknowledgement, however, followed the Pike Court 
purportedly adopting a slightly different “general rule”: if “the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and 
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”69 For this general rule, now parroted 
as the Pike balancing test, the Court cited an inapposite case.70 
Therefore, the DCC analysis in vogue since the 1970s, modified 
somewhat by an additional 1980s appendage, contains three elements. First, 
statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce on their faces, in 
purpose, or by practical effect are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis that 
requires the state or local entity establish a legitimate state or local interest 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 353-56. 
 64. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970). 
 65. Id. at 146. 
 66. Id. at 145-46. 
 67. Id. at 142 (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 
(1960)). In Portland Cement, the Court upheld Detroit’s smoke abatement ordinance to ships 
traveling in interstate commerce. 362 U.S. at 448. But Portland Cement did not articulate a 
balancing test. See id. at 443. Instead, the Court referred to a variety of “verbal 
generalizations,” conflated federal preemption and DCC analysis, and, in the specific section 
of its opinion addressing the DCC challenge, framed the inquiry by stating that “[s]tate 
regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand.” Id. at 
444, 448. 
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and the means adopted be the least discriminatory options available.71 
When such discriminatory laws are “motivated by ‘simple economic 
protectionism,’ [they] are subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity,’ 
which can only be overcome by a showing that there is no other means to 
advance a legitimate local purpose.”72 A recent well-publicized example of 
an impermissible effort at protectionism occurred in Granholm v. Heald, 
where the Court invalidated certain state efforts to favor local wineries and 
distributors.73 
Also, discrimination occurs when a party presents sufficient proof of 
disparate impact against out-of-state entities, though the cases in this area 
are not necessarily consistent. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission, for instance, the Court treated an otherwise 
facially neutral law as it would a law that discriminated on its face.74 In 
Hunt, North Carolina required that all closed containers of apples sold or 
shipped into the state bear only the federal grade or standard in lieu of 
simply noting that they were from the famed fields of Washington State.75 
The Court agreed with the lower court’s finding that the state program had 
the practical effect of both burdening interstate sales and discriminating 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. Of course, the Court has suggested that the strict scrutiny 
analysis is somewhat artificial, indicating that the Court has “generally struck down the 
statute without further inquiry” when the statute either discriminated “directly” against 
interstate commerce or “favor[ed] in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.” 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579; see also 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575, 582 (1997) 
(referencing earlier cases that held facially discriminatory laws “virtually per se” 
unconstitutional). 
 72. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338-39 (2007) (quoting City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
 73. 544 U.S. 460, 474 (2005). Recent state distinctions between interstate and intrastate 
shipments of wine to local consumers have prompted a number of lawsuits with arguably 
inconsistent results. See, e.g., Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2010) (finding statute differentiating permissible sale methods for small and large wineries 
unconstitutional when Massachusetts boundaries did not include any large wineries); Cherry 
Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (invalidating requirement 
that direct shipment purchases of wine from small farm wineries be made in person); 
Jelovsek v. Bredesen, 545 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding ban against direct 
shipment); Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(upholding Maine statute). Favoring local over out-of-state workers also presented facial 
discrimination. See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 74. 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977). But cf. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 
117, 128-29 (1978) (upholding law that adversely affected out-of-state interests). 
 75. 432 U.S. at 335. 
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against them.76 But it appears difficult to convince a court to apply a strict 
scrutiny test to statutes that may have a discriminatory impact where 
discriminatory animus is not readily apparent.77 
Second, a statute or local program that does not discriminate on its face, 
in purpose, or in effect is scrutinized under Pike balancing “whether the 
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce 
clearly exceeds the [putative] local benefits.”78 In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., for example, the State prohibited the sale of milk in 
nonrecyclable plastic containers, which on its face was nondiscriminatory.79 
Yet, Minnesota had a substantial paper, rather than plastics, industry and 
the statute effectively favored the in-state paper industry over the more 
substantial out-of-state plastic industry.80 Even though the trial court found 
that the State’s purpose was to favor local interests, the Court concluded 
that the statute regulated evenhandedly and applied the balancing test to 
uphold the law: “Even granting that the out-of-state plastics industry is 
burdened relatively more heavily than the Minnesota pulpwood industry, 
we find that this burden is not ‘clearly excessive’ in light of the substantial 
state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other natural 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 350-51. 
 77. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 117 (upholding facially neutral law even with proof of 
discriminatory purpose); Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (upholding law alleged to adversely affect only out-of-state entities); Constr. 
Materials Recycling Ass’n Issues & Educ. Fund v. Burack, 686 F. Supp. 2d 162, 173 
(D.N.H. 2010) (prohibiting burning wood derived from construction and demolition debris at 
municipal combustors except for “incidental combustion” when most of debris were 
arguably from out of state); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Cooper, 681 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (affecting sale of ethanol-blended gasoline). An effect, moreover, may not 
be discriminatory if it results from natural conditions. See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 
600 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Baldacci, 505 F.3d at 37 n.7). Age verification 
statutes for the purchase of alcohol can also prompt DCC challenges. E.g., Lebamoff Enters., 
Inc. v. Huskey, 666 F.3d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir. 2012) (favoring local wineries in effect). 
 78. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Some courts exhibit 
little interest in applying the balancing test absent disparate treatment between intrastate and 
interstate commerce. E.g., Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(regarding an Illinois statute against slaughtering horses). Yet overlooking balancing could 
be troublesome on appeal. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Brown, 567 
F.3d 521, 528 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e remand to the district court to apply the Pike balancing 
test in the first instance.”). 
 79. 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981). 
 80. Id. at 473. 
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resources and easing solid waste disposal problems . . . .”81 Unfortunately, 
the line between applying Pike balancing and applying strict scrutiny is not 
always evident: “We have also recognized that there is no clear line 
separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid 
under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce 
Church balancing approach.”82 
Finally, if a state or local program operates extraterritorially, it too may 
offend the DCC.83 During the 1980s, arguably with little appreciation for 
history, the Court ostensibly added to its DCC jurisprudence that a state 
program could not regulate conduct outside that state’s borders.84 In Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, for instance, 
the Court emphasized that New York’s lowest-price-affirmation provision 
in that state’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law had the impermissible 
practical effect of influencing prices in other states.85 
Two defenses might shield an otherwise viable DCC claim. First, 
Congress can affirmatively permit a state or local community to 
discriminate against interstate commerce.86 If Congress has legislated under 
a valid exercise of its Commerce Clause power, then the legislation may 
authorize state discrimination or a burden on interstate commerce.87 One 
example is hunting and fishing licenses, which often cost more for purchase 
by out-of-state residents than by in-state residents.88 Congress sanctioned 
such discrimination when it passed the Reaffirmation of State Regulation of 
Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005.89 Congress can 
also permit otherwise state protectionist measures when it approves 
interstate compacts, such as restrictions on the use of in-state water in 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. When examining local benefits, a court might limit its inquiry into “putative” 
benefits, not whether those benefits actually will occur. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. 
Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 313 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 82. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.  
 83. E.g., id.; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion); 
Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc., 492 F.3d 484, 491 (4th Cir. 
2007) (stating that the program cannot seize on in-state activities to reach out-of-state 
conduct). 
 84. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 85. 476 U.S. at 581-84. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
 86. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). 
 87. See id. (“Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over 
interstate commerce.”). 
 88. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 6036, 119 Stat. 231, 289 (2005). 
 89. Id.; see Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006); Schutz v. Thorne, 415 
F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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interstate markets.90 Yet, before any congressional act will be treated as 
authorizing a regulation that otherwise would fail under a DCC analysis, the 
Court appears to demand that Congress express its intent in an 
unambiguous fashion.91 Accordingly, 
An unambiguous indication of congressional intent is required 
before a federal statute will be read to authorize otherwise 
invalid state legislation, regardless of whether the purported 
authorization takes the form of a flat exemption from Commerce 
Clause scrutiny or the less direct form of a reduction in the level 
of scrutiny.92 
In New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, the Court observed that 
“when Congress has not ‘expressly stated its intent and policy’ to sustain 
state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, we have no 
authority to rewrite its legislation based on mere speculation as to what 
Congress ‘probably had in mind.’”93 And it is incumbent on the proponent 
of an asserted congressional authorization to prove that Congress evinced 
its intent.94 
Second, a state or local government may favor its own residents when 
acting as a market participant by entering the economic marketplace rather 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(reviewing an Oklahoma-Texas compact), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). 
 91. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 
427, 431 (1946)). 
 94. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992). The more likely scenario is 
that the defendant in such cases will argue that the potentially offensive measure has been 
preempted. In Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 
for example, the Court held that the district might not be able to use section 209 of the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) as authority for escaping preemption of local rules regarding fleet purchases. 
541 U.S. 246, 259 (2004). Yet, in leaving open the possibility that some fleet purchase 
requirements might not be preempted by the CAA, the Court indicated quite possibly that 
those rules might then be tested under a variation of the market participant doctrine of the 
DCC, which is precisely what occurred after the Court’s remand. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). Although 
preemption might obviate the need for a lower court to reach a DCC issue, this can become 
problematic if the appellate court similarly avoids addressing a DCC challenge after 
reversing the lower court’s finding of preemption. See, e.g., Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 
F.3d 1093, 1097 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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than remaining as merely a market regulator.95 In Hughes v. Alexandria 
Scrap Corp., for example, Maryland developed a program to purchase old, 
abandoned vehicles.96 The program treated in-state residents and out-of-
state residents differently, requiring considerably more documentation as 
evidence of title and ownership from nonresidents.97 While such facial 
discrimination ostensibly would have required that the State overcome a 
strict scrutiny inquiry, the Court held that “[n]othing in the purposes 
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of 
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the 
right to favor its own citizens over others.”98 The Court subsequently 
applied this market participant exception in South-Central Timber 
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke involving Alaska’s requirement that all 
purchasers of state-owned timber had to process that timber in the state 
prior to it being exported.99 But the South-Central Timber Court 
emphasized that the market participant exception extends only to the market 
the State enters and no further.100 It does not sanction state efforts to 
effectively regulate a particular market.101 And the doctrine does not shield 
a state from a constitutional challenge under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.102 
Also, writing for the majority in United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that the case involved the limited circumstance where the 
government regulation addressed a “traditional governmental activity”: the 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 443-44 (1989); Norman R. Williams, 
Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 
473 (2008). 
 96. 426 U.S. 794, 796 (1976). 
 97. Id. at 801-02.  
 98. Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). 
 99. 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984). 
 100. Id. at 97.  
 101. Id. at 95-96; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430 (1980) (entering the 
cement business); United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Davis, 602 F.3d 618, 624-27 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(entering the healthcare market). 
 102. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. Compare 
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, 460 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1983) (upholding local 
hire preference under DCC for city-funded construction projects), with United Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 211 (1984) (applying Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to local hire preference provision for city construction projects and 
remanding for additional factual determinations by the lower court). 
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management of solid waste.103 He wrote that “[t]he [DCC] is not a roving 
license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state 
and local government to undertake, and what activities must be the province 
of private market competition.”104 When addressing whether the program 
prevented those who would be harmed by the flow control ordinance from 
protecting their interests through the political process, the Chief Justice 
noted that “the most palpable harm imposed by the ordinances—more 
expensive trash removal—is likely to fall upon the very people who voted 
for the laws.”105 He therefore saw “no reason [to afford] local businesses a 
victory they could not obtain through the political process.”106 
III. Cabining Communities: Barriers to Innovation 
This somewhat convoluted approach to the modern DCC now hampers 
state and local efforts to shape their communities and corresponding 
economies, as well as to respond incrementally to environmental threats 
that are both local and global. Although a consensus formed during the 
modern environmental movement’s early years that states would seek to 
attract businesses away from other states by imposing the least onerous 
environmental restrictions possible unless otherwise hindered by 
Congress,107 that assumption has limits. California, for instance, began 
aggressively controlling air emissions before Congress responded with the 
Clean Air Act, and when Congress passed the Clean Air Act it included a 
particular ability for California to continue to set emission standards for 
automobiles moving forward.108 In addition, Delaware adopted its own 
                                                                                                                 
 103. 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007). 
 104. Id. at 343. 
 105. Id. at 345.  
 106. Id. A majority further concluded that the ordinances survived the Pike balancing test 
because any incidental burden on interstate commerce was outweighed by the benefits 
conferred on the local community. Id. at 346-47. Indeed, the majority avoided examining 
any potential or actual burdens on interstate commerce, reasoning that the ordinances 
provided a legitimate and necessary financing mechanism for waste disposal services and, 
moreover, enhanced the local communities’ recycling efforts. Id. 
 107. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210 (1992); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental 
Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 535 (1997). 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(b), 7545(c)(4)(B) (2006). In issuing its own emission 
standards for automobiles, California’s standards must be at least as protective of public 
health as the federal standards. Id. And other states may follow suit and mirror California’s 
standards in lieu of the federal standards. Id. § 7507. When Congress originally preempted 
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coastal zone management program before Congress passed the Coastal 
Zone Management Act.109 
For several decades, state and local communities have served as centers 
for innovation as Congress has become increasingly polarized and generally 
unable to pass legislation absent a crisis or widespread pressure. These 
subnational communities increasingly explore opportunities to shape their 
futures and, whether as a consequence of an overly expansive approach to 
preemption analysis or, when Congress has yet to act, on a DCC analysis, 
have experienced judicial roadblocks.110 When California required humane 
animal treatment by mandating euthanasia and prohibiting slaughtering of 
non-ambulatory animals, the Supreme Court held that federal law 
preempted its effort, even though the State was responding to abuses such 
as “workers at a slaughterhouse in California dragging, kicking, and 
electroshocking sick and disabled cows in an effort to move them.”111 
When New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg, in 2007, pushed to require that 
city taxicabs switch to hybrid cars by 2012, it too was preempted.112 When 
Colorado became one of the first states to pass an aggressive renewable 
energy portfolio standard, conservative organizations opposing climate 
change programs challenged the law for allegedly violating the DCC.113 
And North Dakota similarly claimed Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy 
                                                                                                                 
the states’ abilities to set emission standards for automobiles, it permitted California to 
continue to promulgate its own standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-1(a), 1857f-6(a) (Supp. IV 
1965-68). 
 109. Compare Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 (1971), with Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972). See generally 
Kenneth T. Kristl, Keeping the Coast Clear: Lessons About Protecting the Natural 
Environment by Controlling Industrial Development Under Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act, 
25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 37 (2008) (discussing what helped prompt the state statute). 
 110. For an insightful treatment of how current preemption cases limit innovation, see 
Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change 
Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653 (2008). See, e.g., Teltech Systems, Inc. v. Bryant, 702 
F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012). In Teltech Systems, the lower court invalidated Mississippi’s Caller 
ID Anti-Spoofing Act on DCC grounds and the appellate court avoided the issue by holding 
that the state law was preempted by the federal Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009. Id. at 233-34. 
 111. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969 (2012). California’s ban on the sale 
of foie gras produced by animal cruelty is currently being challenged under the DCC. See 
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 5, Ass’n Des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. 
Harris, No. 12-56822 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 5915406. 
 112. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1569 (2011). 
 113. Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227 (D. Colo. 2012). 
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Act, designed to limit CO2 emissions, violated the DCC.114 It now appears 
almost obligatory, therefore, for scholars to include a DCC cautionary 
discussion in articles promoting renewable energy and climate change 
programs.115 
The DCC stymied earlier state and local efforts to respond to emerging 
problems. Local efforts to control the flow of waste, for instance, present 
the classic example for how the DCC affects local land use decisions. 
Municipal entities often design flow control measures as tools to address 
both limited capacity at waste disposal sites and the need to ensure that 
such sites, if constructed, will have sufficient capacity and financial 
resources to withstand competitive pressures.116 But in City of Philadelphia 
v. New Jersey, the Court struck down New Jersey’s attempt to prevent 
Philadelphia waste from coming into the state and burdening its landfills.117 
The statute prohibited any person from bringing into the state “any solid or 
liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits 
of the State,” with certain caveats.118 Building on its Philadelphia decision, 
the Court, during the early 1990s, began to invalidate waste import 
restrictions that favored local operators of waste disposal facilities, as well 
as local generators of waste—at least without a valid justification for why 
the out-of-state waste imposed a greater cost than in-state waste.119 In one 
                                                                                                                 
 114. North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 11-CV-03232, 2012 WL 4479246, at *1-2 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 30, 2012). 
 115. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and 
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 771, 792-96 (2010); Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in 
Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 636-48 (2005); Jim Rossi, The Limits of 
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1448 (2010) 
(“[P]arochial state REC subsidies appear to raise serious Dormant Commerce Clause 
issues. . . .”); Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their 
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 270-79 
(2008). 
 116. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different from Private 
Ones?: Adopting a New Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. 
REV. 157 (2007). 
 117. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
 118. Id. at 618 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1I-2 (West Supp. 1978)). 
 119. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994); Fort 
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 346-48 (1992) 
(holding that Michigan could not prohibit landfills in a county accepting out-of-county 
waste, even though the statute operated similarly to those regulating out-of-state entities and 
in-state but out-of-county entities); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346-48 
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case, for example, Oregon imposed a surcharge on imported wastes, 
reasoning that the extra surcharge offset the cost imposed on the state for 
having to dispose of another state’s waste.120 In that case, the Court held 
that the statute impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state waste 
(commerce).121 
Then, in 1994, the Court further threatened to stifle local efforts to 
address increasing solid waste as landfill space decreased.122 In C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Court invalidated, on DCC 
grounds, a local flow control ordinance that required all solid waste in the 
community to be shipped through a local transfer station.123 Although 
recyclers could still receive waste, any recyclable materials first had to go 
to the transfer station for sorting, where a transfer fee would be charged.124 
The Court’s majority concluded that this scheme discriminated by 
preventing the local businesses from shipping their already sorted 
recyclables directly out-of-state for processing, even though the law equally 
discriminated against out-of-town processors and in-state entities.125 
In the aftermath of the Court’s controversial Carbone decision,126 lower 
courts struggled with whether to apply the Carbone analysis to publically 
owned and operated transfer stations, with the Second and Sixth Circuits 
disagreeing.127 The Supreme Court resolved the conflict by concluding that 
similar local measures protecting public facilities should be treated 
differently than measures that discriminate among private facilities.128 
Authoring the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that the 
DCC would not apply when state and local governments undertook a 
“traditional governmental activity,” such as the management of solid 
                                                                                                                 
(1992) (holding that Alabama could not impose a tax on out-of-state hazardous waste 
facilities that was not also imposed on in-state facilities). 
 120. Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 95. 
 121. Id. at 108. 
 122. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 123. Id. at 394-95. 
 124. Id. at 386. 
 125. Id. at 393. 
 126. See generally Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998); Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce 
Clause, Environmental Justice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 
(1997). 
 127. Compare Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Daviess Cnty., 434 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 
2006) (striking down county ordinance), vacated, 550 U.S. 931 (2007), with United Haulers 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding county ordinances), aff’d, 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 128. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 347. 
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waste.129 The DCC, he wrote, “is not a roving license for federal courts to 
decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to 
undertake, and what activities must be the province of private market 
competition.”130 
Challenges to flow control ordinances have not necessarily dissipated 
since United Haulers Ass’n. The voters of Kern County, California, for 
instance, adopted an ordinance that barred out-of-county entities from 
spreading treated sewage sludge on farmlands in the county, purportedly 
out of a concern that the application of biosolids might migrate and 
adversely affect water supplies and farmlands.131 The ordinance prevented 
the City of Los Angeles and other recyclers from using Kern County lands 
for waste.132 The district court sided with the City of Los Angeles, 
concluding that the county ordinance violated the DCC, as well as the 
California Waste Management Act.133 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit deftly 
avoided the issue by concluding that the petitioners lacked prudential 
standing.134 And the City of Dallas recently lost a challenge to its flow 
control ordinance, but under the Contracts Clause and state constitutional 
provisions rather than under the DCC.135 But these restrictions against 
certain flow control programs ignore that “[f]orcing a community to accept 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. at 334; see also supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
 130. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 343. 
 131. City of L.A. v. Cnty. of Kern, 509 F. Supp. 2d 865, 869 (C.D. Cal. 2007), vacated in 
part and appeal dismissed in part, 581 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 888. 
 134. City of L.A. v. Cnty. of Kern, 581 F.3d at 849. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
the Supreme Court invoked standing to prevent in-state residents from challenging, under 
the DCC, location subsidies granted to DaimlerChrysler for its Jeep plant. 547 U.S. 332, 
347-49 (2006). The lower court held that the tax credit impermissibly discriminated against 
interstate commerce. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2004), 
vacated in part, 547 U.S. 332; see also On the Green Apartments L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 
241 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2001); Individuals for Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Washoe 
Cnty., 110 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. Fla. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 
703 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting prudential standing challenge). For a critique of 
applying the zone of interest test to such DCC challenges, see Bradford C. Mank, Prudential 
Standing and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Why the “Zone of Interests” Test Should Not 
Apply to Constitutional Cases, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 23 (2006). In the challenge to Solano 
County’s bar on importing waste, the abstention doctrine became another avenue for 
avoiding the constitutional question. See Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 
F.3d 876, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 135. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. City of Dallas, No. 3:11-cv-3200-O, 2012 
WL 4893016, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2012). 
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waste imported from elsewhere . . . imposes real costs on the community: 
increased fear, a loss of autonomy, and a denial of equity.”136 
As with local flow control measures, state programs designed to protect 
local natural resources quite often prompt adversely affected parties to 
claim that such programs impede the free flow of interstate commerce. 
Prior to the New Deal, the Court often rejected challenges to state statutes 
arguably favoring protecting in-state natural resources.137 For the most part, 
these cases employed the now defunct DCC approach expressed in cases 
such as Cooley v. Board of Wardens138 and Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum 
in Brown v. Maryland.139 In Geer v. Connecticut, for instance, the Court 
upheld a prohibition against the out-of-state shipment of woodcocks, ruffled 
grouse, and quail, reasoning that such wildlife was the property of the state 
until reduced to capture, and, as such, jurisdiction over this type of property 
reflected a valid aspect of a state’s police power.140 Similarly, the Court 
upheld New Jersey’s prohibition against the out-of-state shipment of state 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 237-38. 
 137. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (upholding oil and gas 
conservation statute under Fourteenth Amendment challenge); Patapsco Guano Co. v. Bd. of 
Agric., 171 U.S. 345 (1898) (upholding requirement for inspection and labeling of fertilizer 
entering the state); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (upholding game law under 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge); Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217 (1876) (upholding 
quarantine protection statute and tax). Morton Keller explains that “[t]he depletion of fish 
and game, timber, and other resources evoked increasing concern in the late nineteenth 
century.” MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA 393 (1977). States also began to deploy common law injunctive powers to thwart 
cross-state shipment of waste. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND 
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 224-27 (1996). And Michigan Supreme 
Court Justice Thomas Cooley, quite possibly too expansively, boldly asserted that the states 
possessed unquestioned authority to regulate the use of navigable waters. See THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 728 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th 
ed. 1890) (1868). But cf. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (striking down animal 
inspection requirement); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (striking down animal 
inspection requirement); Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877) 
(disallowing quarantine protection statute as too broad). 
 138. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
 139. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827) (applying original package doctrine that 
limited states’ abilities to tax an article of commerce to after it became part of the general 
mass of state property), abrogated by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 
175 (1995). 
 140. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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waters in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.141 In contrast, however, 
the Court refused to uphold Oklahoma’s effort to embargo natural gas 
resources in the state142 and invalidated a variety of state programs affecting 
the exportation of in-state raised or harvested products.143 
Of course, the post-New Deal Court did not just abandon the early tests; 
it also overruled Hudson County and Geer, two of its early unique 
decisions, through its decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma.144 In Hughes, the 
Court overturned an Oklahoma law prohibiting the transport of minnows 
caught in the state for sale outside the state.145 A Texas minnow dealer 
purchased minnows from an Oklahoma minnow dealer and was arrested 
when he attempted to transport the minnows out of state.146 The Court 
began its analysis by observing that Geer was decided early in the 
“evolutionary process” of the DCC and, as such, overruled the case.147 The 
Court then applied the two-part modern DCC analysis from post-New Deal 
cases, including the balancing test from Pike, but suggested that it was 
affording “ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with 
the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and 
protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state 
ownership.”148 The law’s discrimination on its face prompted the need to 
explore whether the measure satisfied a legitimate local purpose and did so 
with the least discriminatory means.149 While acknowledging the legitimacy 
of the State’s purported purpose of ensuring “ecological balance in state 
waters,” the Court nonetheless concluded that other less discriminatory 
                                                                                                                 
 141. 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
 142. West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911); see also Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923) (defining the issue as “whether one may withdraw 
a natural product, a common subject of commercial dealings, from an established current of 
commerce moving into the territory of the other”). The Court’s differential treatment 
between natural gas and other natural resources prompted sarcastic comments by Professors 
Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, 
JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-1921, at 268-69 (1984). 
 143. E.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1928) (shrimp 
exports); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16, 16 (1928) (oyster exports); Minnesota v. Barber, 
136 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1890) (meat inspection). 
 144. 441 U.S. at 326. 
 145. Id. at 324, 338. 
 146. Id. at 324.  
 147. Id. at 326. The Court also discussed that Geer’s analysis already had been 
undermined by subsequent decisions under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 333-
35. 
 148. Id. at 335-36. 
 149. Id. at 336. 
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means were available, including simply a numerical limit on the amount of 
permissible exported minnows.150 
Yet, in the rare case when a State demonstrates that it is pursuing a 
legitimate end and the means chosen constitute the least discriminatory 
means available to achieve that end, a program may survive a DCC 
challenge, even under strict scrutiny.151 The most notable instance of this 
occurred when Maine restricted the importation of the golden shiner, a 
baitfish that the state worried might carry undetectable diseases that could 
infect native species.152 In Maine v. Taylor, the Court recognized that 
Maine restricted “interstate trade in the most direct manner possible, 
blocking all inward shipments of live baitfish at the State’s border.”153 In 
upholding the law, the Court acknowledged the “strict requirements” of 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, but determined that that those requirements were 
satisfied.154 The trial court’s evidentiary hearing and findings of fact 
regarding the threat to Maine’s ecology, and testimony that it was virtually 
impossible to inspect inward shipments of comingled baitfish for the 
presence of parasites, influenced the Court’s decision.155 The Court 
concluded that these findings were not clearly erroneous and, further, that 
the mere “abstract possibility” that some less discriminatory means might 
be available was insufficient to render the law unconstitutional—the State 
“is not required to develop new and unproven means of protection at an 
uncertain cost.”156 
The DCC also surfaced when the Court constrained Nebraska’s ability to 
block the export of its water resources. When Nebraska sought to restrict 
the out-of-state export of groundwater from wells within the state, the 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 322, 337-38. 
 151. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 151-52 (1986). 
 152. Id. at 132. 
 153. Id. at 137. The lower appellate court declared the law unconstitutional; the Court 
first determined that Maine had the ability to appeal as of right to the Supreme Court under 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1986). Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133, 137. 
 154. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138. 
 155. Id. at 140-42. 
 156. Id. at 147. In an arguably apparent departure from other DCC cases, the Court ended 
by noting that it did not believe that Maine had arbitrarily discriminated against interstate 
commerce. Id. at 151. But Justice Stevens responded, in dissent, that he believed that 
“[t]here is something fishy about this case,” and worried that the State had avoided 
providing sufficient evidence on the lack of other reasonable alternatives, particularly 
because Maine was the only state at the time that limited such importation of baitfish. Id. at 
152-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Court, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, held that the law violated the DCC.157 
Nebraska required a permit for exporting groundwater, and the State would 
issue a permit only if the proposed water withdrawal was reasonable and 
did not adversely affect the ecosystem or citizens of the state, and then only 
if the water was being exported to a state that reciprocated and allowed 
water to be imported into Nebraska.158 The Court accepted the ability of the 
State to ensure against adverse environmental and other effects on the water 
transfer but treated the reciprocity provision as an impermissible 
discrimination against interstate commerce.159 The Court emphasized that 
Nebraska had not shown that its measure was reasonably tailored to address 
a valid conservation concern.160 
But state and local communities are only on the cusp of perhaps more 
troubling applications of the DCC. First, other local land use decisions can 
provoke a DCC challenge.161 Local communities interested in favoring 
small, local businesses in lieu of the large “big box” retailers might inhibit 
the entry of large—in other words, interstate—retailers. Some residents of 
Chicago, for instance, attempted to limit large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, 
Target, and Home Depot, through a living wage ordinance.162 Often, these 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982). 
 158. Id. at 944. 
 159. Id. at 960. 
 160. Id. at 958 (“If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, 
that the intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance to areas of shortage is 
feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining States would 
roughly compensate for any exportation to those States, then the conservation and 
preservation purpose might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision.”). See 
generally Dean Baxstresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming 
Age of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 788 (2010) (suggesting that the 
doctrine was not likely to inhibit marketing). For another case involving impermissible 
reciprocity requirements, see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 
(1976). Professor Christine Klein recently analyzed Sporhase, suggesting that the Court 
asked the wrong question and intruded unwisely into the complexities of state water law. 
Christine A. Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export: Toward a New 
Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 137-39 (2011). 
 161. In Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, for example, a local effort ostensibly to 
preserve the unique and natural character of the local community was invalidated on DCC 
grounds. 542 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2008). Likewise, in Francarl Realty Corp. v. Town of 
East Hampton, East Hampton’s effort to restrict vehicular traffic into the community 
through a ferry law prompted protracted DCC litigation. 375 F. App’x 145, 147 (2d Cir. 
2010); Town of Southhold v. Town of East Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 56 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 162. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST 
GROUPS AND THE COURTS 1-3 (2011). The effort failed under pressure from the interstate 
retailers and the resulting opposition by then-Mayor Daley. Id. 
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efforts are motivated by local economic protectionism, as well as aesthetic 
and other concerns, and “invite scrutiny under the [DCC].”163 
Agricultural and food policy is another burgeoning area where 
innovation may be chilled by the DCC. Both rural communities and urban 
centers are exploring avenues for promoting locally grown foods.164 This 
“locavore movement,” as it is now called, is gaining momentum and helps 
connect people to the place where they live.165 Its potential is great: it could 
become a significant factor influencing how we look at our nearby 
environment, our desire to protect it, and how we approach food and 
agricultural policy moving forward.166 And an emphasis on local food 
production, possibly coupled with the associated interest in organic 
agriculture, could potentially reduce our carbon footprint.167 But, as states 
and communities seek to define “local” food, regulate what and where such 
food can be sold, and perhaps mandate that certain percentages of foods 
bought in schools or other establishments be local, the DCC presents an 
unfortunate challenge.168 
Similarly, state programs designed to shape states’ energy futures and 
quite possibly incrementally whittle away169 at rising GHGs appear 
threatened by an ill-equipped use of the DCC.170 During the past several 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping 
Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAW. 907, 908 (2005). 
 164. See Sam Kalen, Agriculture, Food, and Environmental Policy, 26 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 3 (2011). 
 165. Id. at 7. 
 166. Id. at 6-7. 
 167. See USDA, ECON. RESEARCH REPORT NO. 97, LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS, 
IMPACTS, AND ISSUES (May 2010), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/122868/err 
97_1_.pdf. See generally Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking 
U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593 
(2010); Margaret Sova McCabe, Foodshed Foundations: Law’s Role in Shaping our Food 
System’s Future, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (2011). For the agricultural sector’s 
contribution toward greenhouse gas emissions, see EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2010, at 6-1 (Apr. 15, 2012), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf. 
 168. See Brannon P. Denning, Samantha Graff & Heather Wooten, Laws to Require 
Purchase of Locally Grown Food and Constitutional Limits on State and Local Government: 
Suggestions for Policymakers and Advocates, 1 J. AGRIC., FOOD SYS., & COMMUNITY DEV. 
139 (2010). 
 169. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive 
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 
(2010). 
 170. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1965 (2007) (“[S]tate regulation of GHG emissions may 
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decades, the Court has circumscribed the states’ abilities to distinguish 
between in-state and out-of-state fuels and power generation. In New 
Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, for instance, the Court invalidated 
Ohio’s ethanol motor vehicle fuel tax credit for ethanol produced either in 
the state or from a state that granted an equivalent tax credit for Ohio 
produced ethanol.171 Relying on Sporhase and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. v. Cottrell, the Court held that Ohio’s reciprocity measure constituted 
discrimination and did not survive a strict scrutiny analysis into whether the 
ends were legitimate and the means were the least discriminatory 
alternatives available.172 And, when the New Hampshire public utility 
commission prohibited New England Power from selling in-state generated 
energy to out-of-state entities, even though the company had been selling 
into the interstate market inexpensive hydroelectric power generated in the 
state for over fifty-four years, the Court, in New England Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, held that this prohibition offended the DCC.173 Little doubt 
existed that the law served an economic protectionism purpose and the 
Court noted that “[o]ur cases consistently have held that the Commerce 
Clause . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a 
preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources 
located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom.”174 
California’s recent effort to reduce greenhouse gases by adopting a low 
carbon fuel standard is the latest example of how the DCC constrains state 
innovation.175 The State required fuel providers to establish the “carbon 
intensity” of their fuels based on a life-cycle analysis, and where the fuel 
was produced affected the carbon intensity level.176 Corn-based ethanol 
from the Midwest had a higher “carbon intensity” level, prompting the 
                                                                                                                 
face a variety of legal obstacles, including challenges . . . under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause . . . .”). 
 171. 486 U.S. 269, 271, 274-75 (1988). 
 172. Id. at 274-76 (utilizing the holdings from Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 
(1982) and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)). 
 173. 455 U.S. 331, 344 (1982). More recently, a district court invalided Vermont’s effort 
to require an in-state nuclear power generator to sell power to in-state utilities at below 
market rates. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 242-43 
(D. Vt. 2012). 
 174. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 
437, 461 (1992) (invalidating law that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric utilities to burn 
at least ten percent Oklahoma mined coal). 
 175. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051-52 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 176. Id. 
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affected industries to challenge the program as violating the DCC.177 The 
district court agreed, holding that the law impermissibly discriminated 
against the out-of-state fuel providers and also operated extraterritorially.178 
And the court further applied a strict scrutiny analysis to conclude that other 
reasonable, non-discriminatory means were available.179 
IV. Next Generation Analysis? 
The DCC provokes diverse views and, quite possibly, strange 
bedfellows. The strict textualists on the Court express reservations about 
imputing a negative element into the affirmative grant. Justice Thomas, for 
instance, would simply “discard the Court’s negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”180 Justice Scalia similarly questions the constitutional 
justification for the DCC, although he would adhere to stare decisis in 
instances (1) where the state law discriminates on its face against interstate 
commerce and (2) when the state law cannot be distinguished from a law 
previously invalidated by the Court.181 The other conservatives on the Court 
are less sanguine in their approach, with the Chief Justice not overtly 
expressing any reservations and Justices Alito and Kennedy, though 
troubled by the Court’s effort in Carbone to distinguish between private 
and public facilities, inclined to unquestioningly follow precedent.182 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. at 1052. 
 178. Id. at 1070. 
 179. Id. at 1058. As of May 2013, the Ninth Circuit has already entertained oral argument 
in this case but has not issued an opinion. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit Calendar for San Francisco, California 2 (Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://cdn. 
ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/calendaring/2012/10/11/sf10_12.pdf. 
 180. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“‘[T]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little 
sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application,’ and, consequently, cannot serve 
as a basis for striking down a state statute.” (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting))). 
 181. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also Tyler 
Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 
69, 94 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See generally 
Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Foolish Formalism?, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1717 (1991). 
 182. See United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy emphasized that a state may discriminate in favor of 
local economic interests when acting as a market participant, but not when acting as a 
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Former Justice Souter questioned the Court’s ability to employ the Pike 
balancing test,183 prompting Justice Scalia to agree.184 But the Court’s 
decision in Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis signals that a 
majority of the Court appears reluctant to abandon or modify the DCC.185 
Yet, increasing scholarly commentary continues to undermine aspects of 
the DCC, suggesting that this dynamic doctrine has not yet reached stasis. 
Beginning in the 1980s, mounting scholarship, including one of my 
articles,186 began to question the Court’s neatly organized approach to DCC 
cases.187 That criticism continues today, including by two of the leading 
contemporary scholars on the DCC. Professor Brannon Denning proffers 
                                                                                                                 
market regulator—even for otherwise legitimate reasons—when other nondiscriminatory 
means are available. Id. at 364-65. For a discussion of United Haulers Ass’n, see Bradford 
Mank, The Supreme Court’s New Public-Private Distinction Under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: Avoiding the Traditional Versus Nontraditional Classification Trap, 37 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1 (2009). 
 183. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353-56 (2008). 
 184. Id. at 359-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also United Haulers Ass’n, 550 
U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
 185. 553 U.S. at 341. Kentucky exempted interest on bonds that it or its political 
subdivisions issued from state income tax but did not exempt those from other states or other 
states’ political subdivisions. Id. at 333. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Souter, the 
Court held that United Haulers Ass’n controlled and the program was constitutional. Id. at 
341. The Court treated the issuance of bonds as a traditional governmental activity, designed 
to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by financing over time public 
infrastructure development. Id. Justice Stevens’s concurrence added that the “state action 
that motivates the State’s taxpayers to lend money to the State is simply not the sort of 
‘burden’ on interstate commerce that is implicated by our dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.” Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 186. Kalen, supra note 23. 
 187. See generally Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 
YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of Its 
Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too 
Much—An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 
(1981); Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409 (1992); Martin H. 
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance 
of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State 
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 
(1986); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State 
Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. 
REV. 885 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. 
REV. 125; Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
487 (1981). But see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988) (defending the DCC). 
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that the Court’s current analysis is unsound and likely to change once 
again.188 And Professor Norman Williams nevertheless questions the 
dominant theories justifying continued allegiance to the restriction against 
certain state and local programs.189 The fundamental question he and others 
ask is: which constitutionally grounded theory supports modern DCC 
doctrine?190 
Two principal theories generally animate the Court’s support for the 
DCC. The historic rationale for enforcing the DCC is to protect against 
having “one state in its dealings with another . . . place itself in a position of 
economic isolation,” contrary to the underlying theory of the Constitution 
“that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.”191 In H. 
P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, therefore, the Court characterized the 
DCC doctrine as ensuring that economic interests would “have free access 
to every market in the Nation.”192 Justices Kennedy and Alito recently 
articulated this understanding when they dissented in Department of 
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, observing that free and unobstructed national 
trade is a primary objective of the Constitution.193 This, of course, explains 
why the Constitution includes the Commerce Clause, not necessarily why a 
corollary negative is necessary. But the Court also proffers that the DCC 
reflects a political process objective, by protecting unrepresented voices 
from being disadvantaged through parochial state or local political 
processes. Chief Justice Stone promoted this justification in his two 
principal DCC cases.194 More recently, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 516 (2008). 
 189. Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 409, 414 (2008). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523, 527 (1935). 
 192. 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
 193. 553 U.S. 328, 362-376 (2008) (Kennedy & Alito, JJ., dissenting). In Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court again emphasized that the purpose 
of the DCC is to avoid economic balkanization. 520 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1997). 
 194. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (“[I]t is 
unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when 
interests within the state are affected.”); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 
303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) (“Underlying the stated rule . . . [is that such discriminatory 
legislative action] is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally 
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.”); see also 
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940). Chief Justice 
Stone also authored the now famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
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that the Court examines whether “‘the burden of state regulation falls on 
interests outside the state, [and thus the burden] is unlikely to be alleviated 
by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests 
within the state are affected.’”195 
Neither of these theories appears all that persuasive today. Professor 
Denning, for instance, criticizes the Court’s “failure to articulate an 
adequate constitutional operative proposition for the [DCC].”196 To begin 
with, a national free market paradigm of avoiding economic balkanization 
is overly simplistic in today’s global economy. The movement of people, 
capital, products, and information is quicker, easier, and more transparent 
than ever from the local level to the international one. A transaction can 
occur just as easily over the Internet with a neighbor as it can with a 
company in a nearby state or a vendor across the ocean. To suggest that the 
judiciary is capable of appreciating the modern economic marketplace in 
cases involving selective adversarial parties is overly optimistic. It also 
suggests implicitly (because to state it overtly is to undermine it) that there 
is a “constitutional right” to have a nationally free market—except to the 
extent Congress directs otherwise or to the extent that the Court finds the 
right is not overly burdened.197 But the notion of a “constitutional” right to 
engage in interstate commerce has long since passed. To the extent, then, 
that it has any modern resonance, it must be that, abstractly, the framers 
intended for the Constitution to embody some aspect of then-prevalent free 
market principles and assign to Congress the exclusive ability to adjust 
those principles. And, if so, the courts must confront delimiting the 
amorphous contours of this principle.198 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
                                                                                                                 
inaugurating the political process justification for judicial scrutiny. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938). 
 195. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
345 (2007) (quoting S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767 n.2). Justice Stevens invoked this rationale 
in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy. 512 U.S. 186, 191-92, 200 (1994). 
 196. Denning, supra note 188, at 424. 
 197. If it is not an individual right, then it is a constitutionally abstract principle because, 
otherwise, it must be a right entrusted to Congress, with the judiciary then protecting 
Congress’s “right” to decide when or to what extent the free market may be impeded. 
 198. In examining how this principle plays out by protecting against economic 
protectionism, Professor Lisa Heinzerling concludes that “[t]he Court’s nondiscrimination 
principle does not promote economic efficiency in individual cases (or if it does, it does so 
only sporadically and fortuitously), because the Court does not even attempt a serious 
accounting of the benefits and costs of laws that discriminate against interstate commerce.” 
Heinzerling, supra note 136, at 220. 
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political process rationale arguably furnishes an easier theory and correlates 
better with the anti-discrimination emphasis in the cases.199 
In lieu of current rationales for the DCC, scholars continue to proffer 
alternative theories. Professor Denning posits that the Constitution 
embodies a “union-protecting theory” as necessary to avoid state 
“predation.”200 Professor Williams, conversely, suggests that the historical 
understanding of the Commerce Clause does not support either existing 
theory, and instead offers a theory premised upon “deliberative equality.”201 
He suggests that the DCC should restrain states from acting parochially: 
“[S]tates need not actually accord equal treatment to out-of-state interests, 
but rather only give equal regard to such out-of-state interests as they give 
to similarly situated in-state interests.”202 This emphasis on theory by 
Professors Denning and Williams unfortunately overshadows how any 
theory translates into tests capable of being administered by the judiciary. 
During each of the prior generations of DCC cases, it was the tests that 
became unworkable. And it is once again the tests that are cabining 
innovation and again are unwieldy. And it is these tests that warrant critical 
examination. 
At the very least, the Court’s unnatural extraterritorial appendage to its 
DCC analysis needs excising. In the 1980s, the Court ostensibly added this 
element to its DCC analysis, suggesting that state attempts to reach conduct 
beyond their borders are per se unconstitutional. In Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the Supreme Court 
held that New York’s price-affirmation statute for the sale of liquor into the 
state violated the DCC.203 New York’s law attempted to ensure that the 
price paid for liquor in that state was no lower than the price paid by 
consumers in other states.204 In addition, New York prohibited distillers 
selling into the New York market from paying promotional allowances to 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 187, at 998. 
 200. Denning, supra note 188, at 477, 484-85. 
 201. Williams, supra note 189, at 414. 
 202. Id. at 416. He adds: 
[I]t does not disable states entirely from regulating commerce—but it does 
require that state and local policymaking bodies give equal regard to similarly 
situated out-of-state and in-state interests adversely affected or burdened by 
such measures. States may not treat the concerns of out-of-state interests worse 
than those of like in-state interests simply because of their state residence. 
Id. 
 203. 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986). 
 204. Id. at 576. 
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wholesalers—a practice allowed in other states.205 In Brown-Forman, the 
plaintiff conceded that the State had a legitimate interest and that the law 
operated evenhandedly, but the plaintiff argued that the law amounted to an 
impermissible direct regulation of interstate commerce.206 The Court 
framed the question anachronistically, asking whether the state law 
“regulates commerce in other States,” and began with an examination of 
instances where the Court had “examined the extraterritorial effects” of a 
statute.207 When examining the “practical effect[s]” of the New York 
scheme, the Court concluded that it regulated out-of-state transactions 
because: “Once a distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to 
change its prices elsewhere in the United States during the relevant 
month.”208 This, the Court held, was a direct regulation of interstate 
commerce, with the State projecting its legislative reach into other states.209 
Two years later, the Court invalidated, on similar grounds, Connecticut’s 
price-affirmation statute regulating the sale of beer.210 In doing so, the 
Court again examined the practical effect of the law and articulated three 
elements for the extraterritorial inquiry: first, states are prohibited from 
applying their laws to activities outside of their borders; second, states are 
prohibited from “directly control[ling] commerce occurring wholly outside” 
their borders; and third, a court must examine the practical effect of the 
state’s program on other state programs.211 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 579-80. The Court upheld an earlier version of the New York law in Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 52 (1966), abrogated by Healy v. The Beer 
Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989). 
 207. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 580-81. The Court primarily relied upon a lower court 
decision in U.S. Brewers Ass’n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), aff’d, 464 U.S. 909 
(1983), and on the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511 (1935). See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582-83. In Brown-Forman, the Court 
barely noted its prior decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality 
opinion). See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578-79. However, the Court later invoked Edgar 
as support for invalidating extraterritorial laws. See Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 
333 n.9, 336 n.13 (1989). 
 208. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582-83. 
 209. Id. at 582. 
 210. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 343. The Connecticut law “require[d] out-of-state 
shippers to affirm that their posted prices [were] no higher than prices in the border States 
only at the time of the Connecticut posting” and made it illegal “to sell beer in Connecticut 
at a price higher than the price at which beer is or would be sold in any bordering State 
during the month covered by the posting.” Id. at 328-29. 
 211. Id. at 336-37. The Court added: 
[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering 
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This type of extraterritorial inquiry effectively mirrors the now defunct 
DCC analysis the Court abandoned during the New Deal.212 Edgar v. MITE 
Corp. was one of the first instances of this type of inquiry to surface in the 
post-New Deal era, though the case was only a plurality opinion.213 The 
case involved an Illinois Blue Sky law regulating tender offers to 
corporations (1) with principal executive offices in the state, (2) organized 
under Illinois law, or (3) with “at least 10% of . . . stated capital and paid-in 
surplus represented in Illinois.”214 Justice White’s opinion indicated that the 
law both regulated transactions that took place over the channels of 
interstate commerce (mails or other means) and produced results—
transactions—in other states.215 Justice White suggested that the DCC 
“permits only incidental regulation of interstate commerce by the States; 
direct regulation is prohibited.”216 And Justice White concluded that 
Illinois’s law directly restrained interstate commerce, with a “sweeping 
extraterritorial effect,” and therefore was unconstitutional.217 
Justice White’s approach in Edgar, followed by its progeny in Brown-
Forman, Healy, and CTS Corp., overlooks how the DCC changed in the 
post-New Deal era; moreover, Justice White’s Edgar opinion mistakenly 
relies on Southern Pacific and a pre-New Deal case for its analysis.218 
Southern Pacific involved the constitutionality of Arizona’s Train Limit 
Law, which limited the number of passenger and freight cars in trains in the 
                                                                                                                 
the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the 
challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other 
States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted 
similar legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against 
inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory 
regime into the jurisdiction of another State. 
Id. The Court subsequently described Brown-Forman as simply a modern example of the 
DCC being applied when commercial activities might be subjected to inconsistent state 
regulations, as was the case in Southern Pacific. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 
U.S. 69, 88 (1987). 
 212. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
 213. See 457 U.S. 624, 626 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 214. Id. at 642. 
 215. Id. at 640. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 642; see also id. at 643 (“Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly 
and to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly outside the State, it must 
be held invalid . . . .”). 
 218. See id. at 641-43. Oddly, Justice White separately held that the law failed under the 
traditional Pike balancing test, suggesting little need for his foray into antiquated tests. See 
id. at 643. 
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state.219 Chief Justice Stone applied the Pike balancing test, concluded that 
the law burdened interstate commerce too much—it created confusion 
among conflicting state policies—and, as such, required uniform 
regulation.220 But Chief Justice Stone’s apparent reference to the Court’s 
prior DCC cases does not suggest any overt effort to modify its ex ante 
DCC analysis. At one point, for instance, Chief Justice Stone wrote that 
“[w]hen the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and 
effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere 
with its operation, and the consequent incentive to deal with them 
nationally is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within 
state authority.”221 And he cited cases spanning the entire nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.222 He also, in concluding that the burden on 
interstate commerce was too great, added that: “The practical effect of such 
regulation is to control train operations beyond the boundaries of the state 
exacting it because of the necessity of breaking up and reassembling long 
trains . . . .” 223 But, in making this observation, nothing suggests that Chief 
Justice Stone intended to create an independent “extraterritorial” element to 
the DCC. 
Justice White’s reliance in Edgar on Shafer v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of 
Embden224 is even more troubling. Shafer, a short 1925 opinion by the 
conservative Justice Van Devanter, pre-dated the Court’s shift in its DCC 
analysis.225 The decision invalidated the North Dakota Grain Grading Act, 
which imposed licensing and inspection requirements for buyers of grain in 
the state.226 The law did not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state 
grain purchasers, but most of the buyers in the state were shipping their 
                                                                                                                 
 219. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763 (1945). 
 220. Id. at 773-74. 
 221. Id. at 767. The Chief Justice, therefore, unintentionally intimated that the 
local/national tests still had some resonance when he opined: 
There has thus been left to the states wide scope for the regulation of matters of 
local state concern, even though it in some measure affects the commerce, 
provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state 
lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of 
regulation is of predominant national concern. 
Id. at 770. 
 222. See id. at 767-70. 
 223. Id. at 775. 
 224. 268 U.S. 189 (1925). 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. at 194-98. 
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grain to out-of-state terminals.227 The Act worked in tandem with the 
United States Grain Standards Act, omitting the requirement for grading 
and certain inspections if these actions were already performed by a 
federally licensed inspector.228 Justice Van Devanter’s opinion reflected the 
Court’s then-concern that state programs directly interfering with the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce were beyond the State’s 
power.229 “The right to buy [and ship goods] in interstate commerce,” he 
wrote, “is not a privilege derived from state laws, and which they may fetter 
with conditions, but is a common right, the regulation of which is 
committed to Congress and denied to the states.”230 Nothing about this 
now-abandoned “directly” burdens interstate commerce inquiry supports an 
independent extraterritoriality test. 
Not only is any modern justification and application of precedent for an 
extraterritorial inquiry non-existent,231 such use of precedent 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Id. at 192. 
 228. Id. at 192-93. 
 229. See id. at 199-200 (stating that a state law is unconstitutional when it directly 
interferes with or burdens interstate commerce); see also id. at 201 (“We think it plain that, 
in subjecting the buying for interstate shipment to the conditions and measure of control just 
shown, the Act directly interferes with and burdens interstate commerce, and is an attempt 
by the State to prescribe rules under which an important part of such commerce shall be 
conducted. This no State can do consistently with the commerce clause.”). 
 230. Id. at 198-99. 
 231. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), is an oft-cited case in support 
of an extraterritorial inquiry. E.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst. 491 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1989); 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986). In 
Seelig, Justice Cardozo addressed whether New York could apply its milk control law to “a 
dealer who has acquired title to the milk as the result of a transaction in interstate 
commerce.” 294 U.S. at 518. Justice Cardozo’s opinion, although arguably somewhat 
flawed, equated the law to an impost or duty on goods entering the state and, thus, a barrier 
to interstate commerce. See id. at 522. And he observed that “[n]ice distinctions have been 
made . . . between direct and indirect burdens,” but such distinctions served no purpose 
because the law by its terms directly obstructed the flow of commerce into the state. Id. The 
State argued that the law was a valid exercise of its police power, a soon-to-be fading 
argument, and, to that, Justice Cardozo implicitly rejected the old police power versus 
commerce power distinction and added that “states must sink or swim together.” Id. at 523. 
He offered considerations influencing the line between permissible and impermissible state 
regulation, but warned that “[t]he line . . . between direct and indirect restraints of commerce 
[is one of] degree.” Id. at 525. Arguably the more fascinating aspect of his opinion is the 
discussion about the “original package doctrine,” where he suggested that the historic 
doctrine, see Kalen, supra note 23, at 464-65, made little sense and ought to have been 
folded into the general DCC analysis. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 526-28. Presciently, Justice 
Cardozo indicated that states could impose restrictions on the sale of packaged goods from 
“unsanitary sweat-shops.” Id. at 528; see also Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 439-41 
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inappropriately injects into the DCC analysis a bankrupt jurisprudence. 
Today, the Court acknowledges that “[t]he mere fact that state action may 
have repercussions beyond state lines is of no judicial significance so long 
as the action is not within that domain which the Constitution forbids.”232 
The lower court opinions, therefore, often struggle with how to differentiate 
when a program reaches conduct beyond a state’s borders and when it 
merely influences conduct in other states.233 Some courts resort to the now 
defunct direct/indirect test under the rubric of examining the extraterritorial 
question.234 Others occasionally invoke “extraterritoriality,” seemingly as a 
                                                                                                                 
(1936) (prohibiting the sale of convict-made goods). Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit 
recently questioned the continued vitality of the extraterritoriality doctrine. Am. Beverage 
Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 232. Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940). 
 233. Compare Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 809-10 (holding that Michigan’s “Bottle 
Bill” violated DCC’s extraterritorial doctrine), and Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Cuomo, 624 
F.3d 38, 66 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding no price gridlock for tobacco master settlement between 
companies and the state), with Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 216 n.11, 
218 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the extraterritorial analysis did not require examining 
discrimination). In Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, the court intimated the problem with 
an extraterritorial inquiry, noting that many programs had impacts on out-of-state upstream 
prices and it was only when the out-of-state interests wanted to conduct activities in the state 
that that the law operated. 357 F.3d at 220-21; see also Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 
Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 372-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying balancing test 
because the law did not directly regulate the commercial transactions occurring in other 
states); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
argument that milk-labeling law had extraterritorial effect); Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 
F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting extraterritorial argument related to Kansas 
statute that allegedly affected conduct on computers in Missouri); SPGGC, LLC v. 
Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding consumer protection law 
regulating the sale of gift cards in the state); Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. 
Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the Pike balancing test and 
finding that the DCC was not violated by Pennsylvania’s milk pricing laws). The Second 
Circuit, in American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, for instance, collapsed all the tests 
when examining the burden on interstate commerce. 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003). 
Indeed, invoking Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the court indicated that regulation of conduct 
occurring over the Internet, which affected activities out of the state, was extraterritorial and 
demanded uniform regulation. Id. at 104 (citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299, 319 (1851)). 
 234. One court described the inquiry as asking whether the program “involved regulating 
the prices charged in the home state and those charged in other states in order to benefit the 
buyers and sellers in the home state, resulting in a direct burden on the buyers and sellers in 
the other states.” Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 
2001) (emphasis added), aff’d sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644 (2003). In NCAA v. Miller, another court applyied the extraterritoriality inquiry to 
Nevada’s establishment of procedural rules for NCAA enforcement proceedings and 
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shorthand description for the other aspects of the DCC.235 As an 
independent inquiry, however, the analysis is circular. 
Assume, for example, that state A informs all sellers of widgets into state 
A’s markets that those sellers must sell their widgets in state A for no more 
than those widgets are sold for in the bordering states. The law, on its face, 
is non-discriminatory. Yet  widgets are only produced in one of the 
surrounding states. It therefore undoubtedly influences the conduct of the 
sellers of widgets in the neighboring state. But does it directly regulate 
those sellers? It does only if those sellers send their widgets into the state A 
market, and, once they choose to send their product into state A, the law is 
operating within state A, not extraterritorially. Those sellers may be forced 
to alter the price for widgets being sold in other states, but again it is only 
because they first decided to take advantage of state A’s market. And so it 
influences and perhaps, in effect, burdens—arguably even impermissibly 
burdens—interstate commerce. But it is not because the law either can or 
does regulate extraterritorially. 
The notion of an extraterritorial inquiry, moreover, is an abandoned 
nineteenth-century relic. The extraterritorial concept emerged during the 
second half of the nineteenth century as a reflection of the Court’s embrace 
of dual federalism and the principle of territorial sovereignty.236 The Court 
became overly enamored with a spheres-of-jurisdiction paradigm.237 This 
translated into protecting states’ territorial integrity, as well as in 
distinguishing between the state police power and a federal commercial 
power.238 A critical aspect of this arguably simple, yet utterly elusive, 
paradigm was that states undeniably could exercise jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                 
indicated that states could not regulate interstate commerce directly. 10 F.3d 633, 638-40 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
 235. See Freedom Holdings, 624 F.3d at 64 n.18; see also Gerling Global Reinsurance 
Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Commerce Clause seeks to 
prevent extraterritorial economic ‘effects,’ not purposes.”). In National Electrical 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell, the court rejected a challenge to Vermont’s labeling law that 
requires manufacturers disclose to consumers that products such as fluorescent light bulbs 
contain mercury and should be treated as hazardous. 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). 
Responding to the DCC argument, the court considered the extraterritorial inquiry as a 
component of the Pike disparate impact analysis. Id. at 109-12. 
 236. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 452. 
 237. Id. at 452-57. A spheres-of-jurisdiction paradigm based upon subject matter, rather 
than geography, arguably reflects an aspect of the federalism model envisioned by the 
framers. This distinction is partly at the center of a dispute between Professors Gordon 
Wood and Alison L. LaCroix. See Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early 
American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (2011). 
 238. Kalen, supra note 23, at 450-84. 
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persons and property within their geographic borders, but not outside.239 
International law and conflict of laws offered support for this principle.240 
And the Court articulated the principle in Pennoyer v. Neff,241 the classic 
personal jurisdiction case. Because an exercise of federal power necessarily 
intruded into a state’s geographic sovereign zone,242 the Court employed 
similar non-geographic spheres that attempted to separate state power from 
federal power.243 The Court accomplished this, in part, by examining 
whether a state law operated directly on persons or conduct beyond its 
borders, and, if so, by suggesting that the matter fell within the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Id. at 452-62, 467-71. 
 240. Justice Story’s treatise on conflict of laws underscores the geographical emphasis of 
a spheres paradigm: 
 [E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its 
own territory. The direct consequence of this rule is, that the laws of every state 
affect, and bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its 
territory; and all persons, who are resident within it, whether natural born 
subjects, or aliens . . . .  
 [N]o State or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of 
its own territory, or persons not resident therein . . . . 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
241, 260 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 21 (1834)). 
 241. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . . [N]o State can exercise direct 
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”), overruled in part 
by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law 
Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 
189-95, 205-06 (2004) (discussing reigning paradigm of territorial sovereignty). 
 242. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870) (“[State and federal 
governments] exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, 
acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.”), 
overruled in part by Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
 243. The Court’s post-Civil War cases on intergovernmental immunity are apt examples 
of how the Court conducted this inquiry. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 454-55. In almost 
inimitable prose, the Court observed, “There are within the territorial limits of each State 
two governments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and 
supreme within their respective spheres. Each has its separate departments; each has its 
distinct laws, and each has its own tribunals for their enforcement.” Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1871). George Bancroft also referred to two separate spheres of 
jurisdiction. 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 332 (1882). And Bancroft has been described as the most 
popular and representative historian of his era. Dorothy Ross, Historical Consciousness in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 909, 915 (1984). Professor G. Edward 
White portrays how common jurisprudential assumptions, such as spheres, transcended 
different areas—a process he calls doctrinal radiation. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 226 (2000). 
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commercial sphere.244 This style of reasoning and mode of analysis was 
what the Court ultimately rejected during the first half of the twentieth 
century. The Court, therefore, should clarify that it never intended to 
resurrect this late nineteenth-century paradigm, and abandon all pretense 
that courts can examine whether a law reaches conduct extraterritorially, 
particularly as a separate DCC inquiry. 
Next, along with interring any pretense of examining the extraterritorial 
effects of state and local programs, the Court should scale back the ill-fated 
effects analysis in the other tiers of the DCC test. An effects analysis 
surfaces when examining whether a state or local program, in effect, 
discriminates against interstate commerce, as well as during any Pike 
balancing. To begin with, examining possible “undue” effects on interstate 
commerce and balancing those effects against a putative local interest is 
troublesome. The balancing test, after all, emerged with little or no 
discussion or analysis.245 And it effectively asks a court to render a 
subjective judgment about the economic marketplace, based solely on the 
information and parties before it, and determine whether the subject 
demands uniformity—that is, the local/national test long since abandoned 
but now disguised behind the mask of Pike.246 It is little wonder that few 
programs fail such a difficult inquiry; Professor Denning aptly suggests that 
the balancing test has been effectively repudiated “sub silentio” because it 
fails to invalidate laws.247 Abandoning Pike, therefore, would have the 
salutary effect of conserving judicial resources and focusing attention on 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 457-84. In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, for 
example, the Court invalidated a law that forced carriers to collect fees from passengers 
before those passengers entered the state. 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875). 
 245. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
 246. Courts, for instance, are not particularly well suited to assess “complex factual 
inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for the product and alternative sources of 
supply.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619 n.8 (1981). 
 247. Denning, supra note 188, at 493. The Eleventh Circuit, however, recently employed 
the Pike balancing test to invalidate the application of a Miami stevedore permit program. 
Fla. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 703 F.3d 1230, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2012). The 
case demonstrates the difficulty with the test; the court emphasized that the application of 
the program illustrated a protectionist motive favoring existing permit holders over new 
entrants—an ostensible discriminatory rather than balancing case. Id. at 1235 And yet the 
discrimination apparently had little to do with in-state versus out-of-state entrants—existing 
permittees were favored over other applicants. Id. The administration of the program, 
according to the court, undoubtedly violated the local ordinance, may have been arbitrary 
and capricious, and quite possibly was applied unequally to similarly situated individuals (by 
unfairly only awarding permits to incumbents). Id. at 1240. But little suggests that it should 
have been resolved on DCC grounds. 
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more significant issues, with minimal risk. To be sure, if state or local 
problems encroach into domains demanding national uniformity, Congress 
remains capable of legislating and avoiding perceived economic 
balkanization. 
The discriminatory effects analysis triggers a slightly different concern. 
Professor Denning correctly observes: “Constitutional law relies on effects 
tests in part to smoke out illegitimate or unconstitutional purposes that may 
have contributed to the passage of the law.”248 The pernicious effects of 
insidious or disguised discrimination can be destructive to our society when 
individual liberties and freedoms are threatened. While the Court during the 
Lochner era ascribed an individual constitutional right to engage in 
interstate commerce,249 no such individual right persists today. The need, 
therefore, to tease out of otherwise nondiscriminatory programs hidden 
discrimination against interstate commerce is somewhat illusory. It 
perpetuates the era when the Court actively scrutinized state programs 
masquerading as police power measures but arguably extending into a 
protected commercial power sphere.250 
Finally, although facial or purposeful discrimination should continue to 
be considered in any DCC analysis, it might be worth exploring whether the 
Court needs to apply a stricter standard of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny makes 
sense when individual rights and liberties are threatened and ensures against 
unnecessary over-reaching. The DCC is different, particularly because 
Congress may permit what the DCC otherwise prohibits. It is the concept of 
an “unbalkanized” country that is being protected under the DCC. And a 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Denning, supra note 188, at 502. 
 249. See Kalen, supra note 23, at 452-56. 
 250. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. The “effect” of a statute, the Court 
reasoned, reflected its “purpose.” See Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1902). 
Justice Samuel F. Miller echoed the prevailing sentiment that examining effects protected 
against intrusion into protected spheres: 
In all cases of this kind it has been repeatedly held that, when the question is 
raised whether the State statute is a just exercise of State power or is intended 
by roundabout means to invade the domain of Federal authority, this court will 
look into the operation and effect of the statute to discern its purpose. 
Morgan’s S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 462 (1886). In Minnesota v. Barber, 
for instance, the Court invalidated an animal inspection statute that arguably prevented 
Chicago slaughterhouses from selling beef into the Minnesota market. 136 U.S. 313, 329-
330 (1890); see also Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30, 34 (1898) (invalidating 
oleomargarine inspection statute); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 281 (1875) 
(invalidating California statute requiring bond for certain passengers entering state); 
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1875) (invalidating bond requirement for 
passengers entering state). 
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lesser standard of scrutiny might permit experimentation that discriminates 
for reasons other than merely bald economic protectionism.251 For instance, 
in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Court invalidated Ohio’s 
attempt to promote local corn-based ethanol production in the state by 
offering a tax credit for in-state producers.252 The law undoubtedly 
discriminated against out-of-state ethanol producers and, under the Court’s 
almost per se invalidity test, violated the DCC. But it’s not altogether clear 
why a state may not decide how best to shape its own land uses, based on 
infrastructure, economics, topography, geography, culture, demographics, 
and climate, and why each state shouldn’t be able to make that decision for 
itself. If, therefore, one state provides a tax subsidy for an industry it wants 
to promote in the state and the DCC forces that state to apply the tax 
subsidy to out-of-state entities, it effectively promotes an industry and 
accompanying land use in another state whose infrastructure, economics, 
topography, geography, culture, demographics, and climate could be 
entirely different.253 And it affects that other state’s ability to shape its own 
future. To the extent that states become concerned over balkanization, 
congressional action remains available. 
Conclusion 
As state and local communities explore innovative solutions for 
addressing many of society’s modern challenges, it is reasonably likely that 
the DCC will function either as a potential obstacle or a chilling effect on 
laudable efforts. The DCC historically “has been one of very considerable 
judicial oscillation,”254 and, yet, the fundamental structure for DCC analysis 
has not changed for quite some time. True, our society and the issues we 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Discrimination, after all, occurs when government “‘fail[s] to treat all persons 
equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not 
favored.’” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2011) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009)). What qualifies as a “reasonable 
distinction” is normative, particularly in the DCC context, because favoring in-state entities 
is often reasonable; it’s just that the DCC ex ante assumes that it is unreasonable and 
requires not just a legitimate justification, but also no other plausible alternative means. 
 252. 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). 
 253. Because this is often the purpose of tax subsidies, drawing the line between 
permissible and impermissible programs is problematic. Professors Hellerstein and Coenen 
comprehensively analyzed this issue, explaining how the line differentiating the two is “ill-
defined” and that “discriminatory subsidies, unlike discriminatory tax breaks, are almost 
always constitutional.” Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints 
on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 792 (1996). 
 254. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 420 (1946). 
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face today are quite different than what our predecessors confronted when 
the DCC analysis became crystallized. But so far, neither time nor the 
changing society has prompted the necessary critical re-evaluation of the 
tests under the DCC. It is apparent that the time has come: the changing 
world economic paradigm, coupled with emerging local efforts to assert 
greater control over local communities and environmental issues, will test 
the contours and, potentially, the efficacy of the current DCC analysis. And 
when that happens, the Court should permit experimental programs except 
in the extreme cases where their sole purposes are economic protectionism. 
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